Insofar as the Korean Courtiers' Observation Mission thought to put their Japanese experiences to practice in advancing Korean reforms, their trip to Japan was an epoch-making event in the history of Korean modernization. The Mission (chosa sich'al dan; also known as sinsa yuram dan in some descriptions) consisted of twelve mid-rank officials, twenty-seven attendants (students included), twelve translators (among them two Japanese), and thirteen servantssixty-four persons in all. The group stayed in Japan for four months in 1881, making detailed observations of its modern structures. This was the first serious Korean attempt to introduce Western institutions using Japan as a model.
The tasks of the Mission members included, for example, detailed reporting on such special topics as the training of Japanese infantry and the work of Japanese customs. As a result of their study, Mission members produced more than eighty books of reports, which concentrated on what they had learned about Meiji industry, politics, economy, society, culture, and education. As a delegation of specialists who could systematically understand and appreciate Japanese modernization, the Mission can be rightfully compared with Japan's Iwakura Embassy (1871). The Iwakura Embassy's scribe, Kumi Kunitake (1839-1931), published his Beio kairan jikki (Account of Travel to America and Europe) in five volumes in 1876, thus making the Embassy's travel an important occasion in the introduction of Western modernity to the Japanese government and populace. 1 As the reports of the members of the Korean Mission were not published, they certainly were not as influential as Kumi's account. However, the reports, with their detailed accounts of things Western, were devoured by "progressives" interested in introducing Western ideas and institutions and were important in breaking down traditional pejorative views of the West and Westernized Japan held by Confucian conservatives. The reports were the primary materials used by Korean authorities in their quest for "selfstrengthening" and "opening" in the 1880s, when they needed to assess Japan's posture on Westernization.
The aim of this article is to explore the characteristics of modernity the members of the Mission encountered in Japan and to show how their experiences were reflected in the process of Korea's own reforms. Our first subject of analysis is the differences between Meiji's symbol of modernity, kokumin kokka (literally, "nation-state," but the nuances of the expression are seriously different from the original term), and its models, the nation-states of Europe. I will then attempt to show how various images of modernity encountered by the Mission members influenced their worldviews and thinking patterns. In conclusion, I attempt to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the reasons for Korea's failure to build a modern state independently by analyzing the differences in the modern experiences of the Korean Mission and the Iwakura Embassy.
Recently, the discourse of modernity and conventional narratives of modern state-building have often been challenged, both internationally and inside the East Asian academic world from the postmodernist, or deconstructionist, perspective. Researchers such as Prasenjit Duara have questioned the linear "monologue" of the nation-state's "modernizational" narrative, suggesting instead a more pluralist, multilinear way of describing history, with due attention paid to the long-marginalized, suppressed narratives of local (versus central/ national) history or folk religion. 2 The deconstructionist criticism of the totalizing teleology of the conventional narrative of "modernization" and the concurrent emphasis on the contested nature of the variety of "modern" projects are certainly important for problematizing the hitherto dominant and unchallengeable master-narrative of "modernity." In Korea's specific case, however, a radical subversion of the "modernizational" perspective on modern history may pose a range of serious problems. Korea remains to this day a divided country, burdened on all levels by what is often seen as essentially a "premodern" nation habitually disregarding human rights and individual freedoms. "Modernity" may mean in Korea's case both the name of the current period we suppose we are living in and the emancipatory project of overcoming the colonial legacy and building a unified nation-state that would live up to what South Korea's civil society tends to consider the modern international standards of respecting human rights and liberties. Inasmuch as the last project remains unfinished business, the conventional narrative of "modern" and "modernization" still continues to be a viable, needed perspective of "rendering the past into history" from South Korean civil society's point of view, although this narrative should not monopolize our historical outlook.
The Symbol of Modern Japan-Japanese-style Nation-State (Kokumin Kokka) As the members of the Korean Mission looked at Japan in 1881, the country was enthusiastically immersed in bunmei kaika ("civilization and progress"), transplanting onto its soil the structures that had emerged in Europe after the French Revolution. For example, the infantry was built on the French model, the navy on the British model, education on the American model, the imperial house on the British model, and the constitution on the German model. All these models were being refashioned in accordance with Japan's circumstances. The dictionary definition of bunmei kaika is "the atmosphere of Westernization in the Early Meiji Period." 3 But Japanese modernity symbolized by bunmei kaika was not simply a copy of Western institutions; the imperial system, which was supposed to revive the ancient Japanese prototypes, was created as well. It was characterized by a kind of symbiosis between Western modernity and Japanese antiquity. In a way, it was the antithesis of Western modernity. Western texts were being misread and misunderstood, and Japan's "West" was based on these misinterpretations. 4 In any case, by 1881 when the Mission came to Japan, the archetypes of Japanese modernity were more or less complete with Japanese kokumin kokka as their symbol.
The modernity that the Meiji Japanese struggled to build was imagined in the form of kokumin kokka-the Japanese form of nation-state. The nationstate was a product of European modernity designed as a mechanism of "human liberation" by French revolutionaries, and the Meiji Japanese aimed to pursue and implement this. For the Koreans of the reform period in the late nineteenth century, it was an aim they failed to accomplish, and it is still thought to be an "unfinished project" by many South Korean intellectuals today. 5 We can summarize the accepted theories on the character of the nation-states in nonWestern regions in the following points. 6 First, in a nation-state-be it republican or monarchical, authoritarian or democratic-the subject of statehood is the nation. The judgment on whether a given state conforms to the criteria for being a nation-state is left to the peer states, the degree of "civilization"-read Westernization-being the implied criterion.
Second, to unify the populace into a "nation," the state needs a range of institutional mechanisms, beginning with the organs of dominance and oppressionarmy, police, government, parliament, and so forth-and ending with print capital, an educational system, and such ideological instruments as religion or family values. Having a strong ideology of "national unity" is a prerequisite.
Third, a nation-state exists only as part and parcel of the international network of nation-states. It must secure its own position in the international system of nation-states, and, even while claiming to be "culturally original," it has to emulate its foreign peers.
As an "imagined community," the nation-state had to consolidate its citizens economically (unification of land-ownership relations, transport system, monetary system, weights and measures), politically (by constitution, parliament, conscript army), intellectually (national population register, national political parties, museums, schools, newspapers), and symbolically/culturally (national flag, anthem, pledge, literary canon, history). In a word, be it democratic or not, the nation-state in non-Western regions is primarily an "imagined community" that uses ethnic "nation" as its basic single unit.
the establishment of state-consolidating mechanisms The consolidating mechanisms of the Meiji state witnessed by the Korean Mission in 1881 were based on the following pattern. The Meiji Restoration centralized political power in Japan, and it certainly was not a bona fide restoration of ancient imperial institutions. Using the emperor as a symbol of state unity, the "clan clique" (hanbatsu) government legitimized the powers it obtained. 7 The administrative mechanisms of the new government were an attempt at Japanization of modern Western institutions-a "re-invention" of sortsrather than a return to old, T'ang dynasty-inspired imperial structures. 8 When the Korean Mission came to Japan in 1881, the central government in reality monopolized all powers, although on the surface, the formalities of Western division of powers were duly observed. 9 Outside of government, the "people's rights" movement advocating constitutional government was enthusiastically campaigning for an elected assembly. Having already established the basis for a modern conscript army, Japan in 1881 was actively preparing an independent judiciary system and a modern penal code.
In fact, the Meiji-styled oligarchic nation-consolidating institutions that the members of the Korean Mission witnessed were not sufficient for building a modern pluralist civil society due to the lack of a matured citizenship. As later historical developments have shown, the oligarchic governmental institutions of the early Meiji period were rife with militaristic potential from the very beginning. Despite all this, however, the Japan of that time was heading toward constitutional government, had formal division of powers, and-at least, on the surface-looked to be developing politically in a broadly modern direction. Japanese governmental structures were the closest possible model for Korea, which also did not possess a developed "third estate."
capitalism-oriented consolidation in the economy The Japan visited by the Korean Mission already had its space "civilized" enough to encourage free movement of products, as well as people, information, and knowledge. The Meiji government was keen to ensure the balanced economic development of the country by building roads and railroads, introducing modern postal and telegraph systems, and encouraging the growth of modern sea transportation-in a word, by modernizing and strengthening transport and communications. The impression of modern comfort was conferred by city roads, illuminated at night, full of rickshaws and carriages. This "civilization of space" was impressive enough to captivate the Mission members. 10 In the Meiji period and after, Japan, under strong governmental guidance, was growing into a modern capitalist power, introducing modern company laws, modernizing the monetary system, reforming its tax statutes, and beginning the process of primitive accumulation of capital through disposition of samurai pensions and other measures. The first task for the Meiji government was to build a central financial institution as a prerequisite for a centralized state. In 1869, the Ministry of Finance was established and was given rather wide jurisdiction over domestic political questions. The Ministry of Industry, established in 1870, started to build government-owned industries focusing primarily on railroads and ship-building, introducing capital and know-how in telegraph communications, the construction industry and ship-building, from Europe. 11 Internally, Japan was laying a foundation of economic unity on its way to modern capitalism, and in its foreign policy, it was beginning to flex its muscles in the direction of imperialist self-aggrandizing, pursuing expansionist policies that included acquisition of Okinawa, incursion against Taiwan, and forcible "opening" of Korea.
cultural unification aimed at creating a "nation" The Meiji government's bunmei kaika strategy meant establishing a centralized political regime through implanting European "civilization" and then "civilizing" the Japanese people in accordance with Western criteria. To create a horizontally equal "nation," the Meiji government first abolished the hereditary status system and then established uniform household registration for the whole populace. In 1872 the regulations on schools were promulgated, "modern" schools being an important mechanism for creating uniform "nationals." Also the trade in human beings (primarily, the practice of selling women to brothels) was abolished and freedom of movement and employment was guaranteed.
In 1873, the old lunar calendar was scrapped in favor of the Gregorian one, thus synchronizing Japan's time with that of Europe. At the same time, regulations on newspapers promulgated in 1871 harshly restricted criticism of the government in media, making newspapers largely establishment propaganda tools. Shinto, a religious system created anew on the basis of pre-existing native cults, was made into the state religion and used as a tool for strengthening social cohesion. Old customs that Europeans perceived as "barbarian," such as mixed bathing of both sexes, were prohibited in an attempt to make the country look "civilized" by Western standards. 12 Thus, the members of the Korean Mission witnessed great changes in customs and mores that followed the "civilizing" Westernizing policies.
The Korean Mission's Projects of Statehood two viewpoints on modernizing japan
The initiative in sending the Korean Mission rested with the Korean government, which was already aware of the necessity of modernizing changes, but it became possible only through the active support of Meiji Japan, which from 1876 onward played a double role in Korea, being both a "sponsor of progress and independence" and simultaneously an imperialist aggressor. 13 What were the criteria for selecting the men for such an important mission? The majority of the courtiers to be sent to Japan came from the established powerful yangban (gentry) lineages. They ranged in age from their late twenties to their mid-fifties and most had had at least ten years of government service after having passed the state civil service examinations. Their ranks in official service ranged from rank 4 upper class (ch0ng) to the rank 2 lower class (chong), and that corresponded to the usual rank level of those sent to Japan earlier as susinsa (special ambassadors). With the exceptions of Kim Yongw0n and Yi W0nhoe, all the courtiers in the Mission had served either with the Office of Special Advisers (Hongmun'gwan) or with the offices of Inspector-General and Censor-General (Taegan), which meant that they possessed vast humanitarian knowledge and literary abilities. Being close to the monarch, they were in a position to judge the general situation in the state and had opportunites to advise Kojong during the "lectures in royal presence" (ky0ngy0n)-palace lectures on Confucian classics, which also served as occasions to discuss current issues and problems in the king's presence. And they were close enough to the throne to be, as in the case of Kang Munhy0ng and Pak Ch0ngyang, urgently recalled from exile and sent to Japan after only two months in the capital, despite objections from the offices of Inspector-General and Censor-General. They were highly experienced practical bureaucrats: Pak Ch0ngyang, 3m Sey0ng, Yi H0ny0ng, Kang Munhy0ng and 3 Yunjung had been dispatched as secret royal inspectors (amhaeng 0sa) to the provinces; 3m Sey0ng, Kang Munhy0ng, Kim Yongw0n, and Min Chongmuk had previous experience as diplomats sent to Japan or China; and Kim Yongw0n and Yi W0nhoe were known as military experts.
Having departed from Korea on April 10, 1881 (May 7, 1881, according to Gregorian calendar), the Korean Courtiers' Mission went on to examine the industrial facilities in Nagasaki, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, and Yokohama and then arrived in Tokyo on April 28. While being helped by Japanese governmental agencies in their mission of interviewing key bureaucrats in various ministries, collecting materials, and translating them into classical Chinese, they also used their free time to inspect various modern utilities, watch naval and infantry drills, and socialize with the movers and shakers of the Japanese economy, politics, and education.
Among the highest-ranking politicians and bureaucrats the Korean envoys were allowed to meet and talk with on the Japanese internal situation and international affairs were Sanjo Sanetomi (1837-1891), the first prime minister (dajo daijin) and the key man in charge of implementing the "rich state, strong army" policy; Prince Arisugawa no Miya Takahito (1835-1895), the first minister of state; Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883), the second minister of state; and Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), Terashima Munenori (1834-1894), and Soejima Taneomi (1828-1905), the full members of the Governing Council (Dajokan). In addition the Korean courtiers met leading figures in the economy, including such corporate heads with strong governmental ties as Okura Kihachiro (1837-1928), the founder of Okura Trading Company; Sumitomo Tomoito (1864-1926), heir to the Sumitomo commercial dynasty; and Shibuzawa Eiichi (1840-1931), founder of the First National Bank. They also had opportunities to meet such prominent Meiji educators as Nakamura Masanao (1832-1891), founder of Dojinsha College, and Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), founder of Keio Gizuku. In addition, they held a gathering with the Tokyo-stationed Chinese diplomats, which also provided an opportunity to exchange views on both Japan and the world situation.
The facilities inspected differed depending on the orders given to each member of the Mission, but, generally, their tours began with the ministries of interior and finance, then went through customs, the mint, and other economyrelated departments. Afterward, they toured law-enforcement institutions (police headquarters, prisons, correction houses) and communications infrastruc-ture (post office, telegraph, and so forth). They also visited the Genroin ("Senate," the legislative body), the Supreme Court and lower courts, and other juridical, cultural, educational, and military institutions. 14 The depth and breadth of one's perception of the world depends on his or her education and experiences, and the Korean Mission's members were no exception. They understood Japan's new institutions on the basis of their previous knowledge, and, to the extent they could approve of the novelties, they were going to apply them to reforming Korea. They were judging the new Japan on the basis of two different ideological viewpoints.
Mission members such as 3 Yunjung (1848-1896) and Hong Y0ngsik (1855-1884) were influenced by an earlier "Enlightenment" thinker, Pak Kyusu (1807-1877), and befriended such reformers as Kim Hongjip (1842-1896), Pak Y0nghyo (1861-1939), and Kim Okkyun (1851-1894), eventually becoming members of the reformist group. Even at the time of their appointment to the Mission, they were free enough from the traditional Confucian ideas on insurmountable differences between "barbarism" and (Chinese Confucian) "civilization" and Korea's "honored" status as "little China" to be able to look at Japan objectively. The rest of the Mission, however, was still judging the world by Confucian standards.
This can be seen in an anecdote included in an article in Choya sinbun (May 20, 1881) 15 describing what happened among the Mission members when they visited the Japanese consulate in Pusan before boarding the steamer for Japan:
When Consul Kondo met the Mission members in Pusan, ch'am1i Sim Sanghak put a hand over his eyes. The Consul asked him whether he had an eye disease and might need a doctor's assistance, but at that moment 3 Yunjung, a progressive, went ahead and said: "Sim's eye disease is to be washed away by Japanese air and water." Sim, a conservative, was angry at the remark and urged 3 to explain himself, and 3 said: "Your eyes, gentlemen, are more than healthy, but you are nothing more than blind men with open eyes, for you do not know how to look at the things properly. Now, as we will go to Japan to witness its civilization, and will get a chance to wash away [Confucian conservatism] from the hearts, we will open our eyes in the way that we will not have to worry even if our actual eyesight will become very poor." A heated discussion followed that remark.
Two interesting things emerge from this dialogue. First, we can understand that, in 3's eyes, some of his fellow Mission members, such as Sim Sanghak (1845-?), were just "blind men with open eyes," the objects of "re-education" in "civilization" in the course of the trip to Japan. Second, we sense that 3 prided himself on being able "to look at things properly," using novel criteria. It was only natural that the yardsticks used to judge Japan were different in the cases of 3 and Hong Y0ngsik, who already had a new frame of reference, such as "civilization and reforms," on the one hand, and, on the other, the more conservative Mission members. Therefore, there were great differences in the width and breadth of their understanding of the Meiji nation-state and in their plans for reforming Korea with the help of Japanese precedents. 16 For 3 and Hong, already liberated from Confucian dogmatism, their observations in Japan were a chance to finalize their own blueprints for Korean reforms. 17 Especially important for them were meetings with such eminent "statist" (kokkenron) thinkers as Fukuzawa Yukichi and observations of "civilization reforms" implemented by the Meiji government, which convinced them of the necessity of centralized, state-promoted reforms or, in other words, "reforms from above through enlightenment of people." 18 As the following personal report to King Kojong after their return from Japan shows, they felt positive about Japan's development and regarded its "rich state, strong army" policies as wellsuited for the situation: 19 Kojong: People say that Japan's system is great and policies are strong. And what did you observe?
Hong Y0ngsik: The system there is really well built, but it is composed of many different things. Many different projects are being promoted simultaneously, and the result is chronic financial deficit. At the same time, I cannot say that their military policies are not solid. They are promoted by diligent, constant labor, daily and nightly. It was not that difficult to achieve what Japan has achieved, given the scale of the efforts.
Kojong: Is it the same as in the Warring States period in ancient China, when only enrichment and strengthening were sought after?korean studies, vol. 29 • 2005 Kang Munhy0ng wrote with deep affection about the past of the Japanese Confucian tradition and lamented its present:
A man of Paekche times, Wang In, brought the books to Japan for the first time, and after this the classics were first studied there. Afterward, scholarship flourished, with lots of people able to revere Confucius and Mencius and discuss Zhu Xi and Brothers Zheng. As soon as the Chinese classics and history books found their way into the country, many literati well-versed in the classics and able to compose in good literary style emerged there. But in recent times, with Western studies in their efflorescence, the Confucian shrines in every domain were either closed or turned into governmental offices, and the teachings of the Five Classics and Four Sages (Confucius, Mencius, Zi Si, Zeng Zi) are not evoked any longer. That is why these literati, who are well-versed in classical Chinese, lead wretched lives, sob sadly, and lament recent times. 23 Min Chongmuk was of a rather similar opinion:
A look at the books newly printed after Meiji shows that eight or nine of every ten are Western ones. Four or five people studying sometimes come to the [Confucian] library, but there are no students. Some people say that it was impudent on the part of high-placed persons to discontinue the Confucian sacrifices. How shameful and lamentable! 24 3m Sey0ng wrote detailed criticism of the Meiji government's cultural policies:
A library was established in place of the Confucian shrine, with hundreds of people coming daily to read the Western, Chinese, and Japanese books collected there. Alas! Could the ancient sages have thought about beginning scholarship with studies of sundry books instead of the classics? 25 The target of Sim Sanghak's criticism was the same:
When I visited the Confucian shrine, I saw the image of Confucius, which was still enshrined there. The building is called "The Pavilion of the Great Sage," the first gate is named "The Gate of Admiration of the Highness," the second gate is called "The Gate of Entrance to the Virtue," and the main gate is named "The Gate of the Gingko Altar." In the building to the left, the Four Canons, Five Classics, and the books of diverse schools were held in obvious respect, but in the building to the right sundry books from various countries were all mixed together, so disrespectfully [toward the Confucian classics in the adjacent building]. 26 They continued to use the Confucian yardstick to judge the appearance of "modernizing" Japan and, quite naturally, were rather critical of it. They acknowledged that, "externally," Japan did strengthen, but they criticized its fiscal deficit as well as the "excessive" Westernization of everyday life. Pak Ch0ng-yang (1841-1905), on return to Korea, confessed his impressions to Kojong in the following way: 27 Kojong: What would you say on Japan's strengths and weaknesses? Pak Ch0ngyang: Judging from Japan's outward appearance, it looks rather rich and strong. It is not that its territory isn't vast, and it isn't that its army isn't strong. Its buildings and machines look outwardly luxurious and well made. But, if you look deeper beyond the surface, there are plenty of weaker points as well. After beginning its intercourse with the West, Japan was just fond of cleverish things without a thought about the deficiency of its finances. Every time a new machine is installed, enormous debts to other countries are incurred. The profits from usage of those machines can hardly offset the debts if the interest is calculated together too. In the meanwhile, the Westerners are poking their noses into everything, making the Japanese feel very constrained. Everything is thus being aped after the West, beginning with policies and customs above and ending with clothes and food below.
Kojong: The Japanese (waein) like the customs of other countries and even changed their clothes in accordance with Western ways. They could not find the golden mean. That is their loss.
Nor was only Pak so critical. Cho Chuny0ng (1833-1886) lamented that, aside from the land and its populace, nothing traditional could be found in the "reformed" Japan. Kang Munhy0ng (1831-?) commented that to "shamelessly emulate the West" meant more losses than gains in the long run. 28 At the same time, many of the Mission members, like Cho Chuny0ng, seemingly thought that the "Japanese military system, armaments, machines, and agricultural practices, insofar as they strengthen the state and enrich the people, are worth taking as examples." 29 In a word, they acknowledged that outwardly Japan had been strengthened but criticized the Westernization of life and customs as well as the financial debacle. They advocated selective introduction of the industrial, agricultural, and military technologies needed to guarantee the state's survival and the people's economic well being, so long as basic traditional values were not touched. As supporters of importing Japanese "modern" systems that did not severely clash with Confucian values, they showed much greater flexibility than the Confucian conservatives who advocated "the defense of orthodoxy and expunction of heterodoxy" (wij0ngch'0ksa). It seems that the elements of Japan's new "modern" institutions impressed them greatly and eventually led to certain changes in their Confucian values.
Sim Sanghak and others, whom 3 Yunjung characterized as "open-eyed blind men," did not entirely divest themselves of their Confucian mentality, but they could be called advocates of "Eastern morality and Western skills" (tongdos0gi) for they did agree to the selective introduction of modern institutions. 3 Yunjung wanted to introduce to Korea the mechanisms of social cohesion observed in Japan. With the Japanese example in mind, he thought about a future Korean state with a symbolic monarch, an emblem of "people's unity," and real power in the hands of a modernizing reformist elite, working through central governmental institutions. He believed that constitutionalism should be delayed until the moment the people remade Korea into a modern "nation" through strengthening the state's power and prestige and creating a strong army; then they would be "capable of participating in the government." Building an effective bureaucracy was the key to making such "reforms from above" a success. In order to remake the bureaucracy into a tool of governance capable of effectively managing resources and leading the populace, 3 Yunjung envisioned discontinuing the traditional Confucian state exams (kwag0), instituting a more meritocratic system of official promotions, and permitting bureaucrats to engage in commercial activities. He also sought the establishment of a modern judiciary as a prerequisite for acquiring a truly independent position in international relations and developing commerce. He was especially preoccupied with abolishing the cruel "feudal" punishments that had become a pretext for unequal treaties and was an active advocate of building a modern army.
His vision of economic consolidation emphasized building of modern transport and communication infrastructures as a prerequisite for more intensive intellectual, commercial, and human exchanges. After that, modern industry was, as in Japan, to be built through the state's encouragement and under the state's active protection. As to ways of financing industrialization, he favored a more centralized financial system and modernization of taxes and also proposed to concentrate capital by creating bigger companies in the manner of the Japanese zaibatsu, the return to Korea of its tariff autonomy, use of money coming from customs duties, and introduction of foreign investment. He may be considered the first in Korea to propose centralized foreign borrowing by the government and to come up with a plan for state-led economic development.
Last, as to the creation of "national culture," he found the reason for Korea's delayed progress in the veneration of Confucianism and considered Western ideology and Christianity a possible ideological alternative useful for supplanting Confucianism in the process of "reforms from above." He also proposed several social reforms aimed at creating a modern nation, including educational reform and abolition of the hereditary status system. He thought about sending students to the West and active adoption of new culture directly from there as well.
These radical proposals were similar to the ideas of such reformers as Kim Okkyun, Hong Y0ngsik, and Pak Y0nghyo and indeed formed a prototype of their program proclaimed during the abortive 1884 Kapsin coup-a failed attempt by radical reformers to grasp power through a palace coup using Japanese military support. In a letter sent to Fukuzawa Yukichi on December 20, 1881, 3 Yunjung characterizes Kim Okkyun, Pak Y0nghyo, and S0 Kwangb0m as his "intimate friends" and asks to "render assistance" to them during their upcoming trip to Japan. 31 An anecdote tells us that during his visit to Japan Kim Okkyun always carried with him 3 Yunjung's travelogue, Chungdonggi, and Pak Y0nghyo's statement in his memoirs that the 1882 mission to Japan provided important momentum for the preparations for the 1884 coup. This suggests how strongly 3 Yunjung influenced the radical reformers.
The Theory of "Eastern Morality and Western Skills": Great Influence among Confucian Literati.
It is clear that for the rest of the Mission membersreformist-minded 3 and Hong excluded-the four-month sojourn in Japan was an opportunity to take a fresh look at Korea's future. But it was not enough to negate deeply inbred Confucian ideas. The result was the theory of compromising "Western skills"-new things useful for strengthening the state and helping the populace-with "Eastern morality"-traditional culture and governmental institutions. The main points of the vision of statehood based on that theory are: 32 First, the proponents of that theory were deeply interested in Japanese "restoration" of ancient imperial institutions, centralized government, division of power, and effective administrative and bureaucratic organization, but they were negative about the idea of enhancing "people's rights." In reality, the objects of their primary interest were the Japanese judiciary, police, and army.
Second, having been reared in the traditional virtues of "economizing the resources" and "loving the commoners," notwithstanding their high esteem for Meiji Japan's outward efflorescence, they were seriously worried by its fiscal deficiency and the dire straits into which the poor were being put. Unlike 3, they favored only selective adoption of Meiji industrial policies, being especially interested in financially profitable transport and communication infrastructure, modern mining technologies and equipment, technical education, museums and industrial fairs and their educational role, and promotion of novel agricultural techniques and education.
Third, they were mainly very critical of changes in Japanese society and customs. Of course, they understood that, for the sake of promoting industry, changes in the traditional hereditary status system and professional hierarchy were inevitable. From the viewpoint of "Confucian utilitarianism" (iyong husaeng), they were positive about newspapers as promoters of public enlightenment and about such institutions as schools for the blind and dumb and Western medical facilities. But, in the end, despite their positive attitudes toward modern Western technology, they did not think that the driving forces of bunmei kaiwa were Western ideas or that these ideas were exactly the soil that made technical civilization blossom. Their "strategy for the state's survival" was basically a makeshift plan centered on the introduction of Western technology and arms and not conducive to the establishment of a nation-state, as traditional values remained sacrosanct.
At the same time, the idea of "selectively introducing" things Western soon gained certain popularity among Confucian intelligentsia and provided momentum for the movement of memorializing the court in favor of "civilization." It was remade into a state policy by a declaration of Kojong issued after the June 1882 Imo Soldiers' Mutiny (a mutiny by soldiers of the "traditional" regiments of the Korean army, provoked by salary delays and preferential treatment given to the "new" Japanese-trained unit) on August 5, 1882: 33 Some of the discussants are worried that intercourse with the West may lead to being infected with the [Christian] heterodoxy, and this worry reflects a deep concern for our [Confucian] orthodoxy and correct mores. But intercourse and the ban on [Christian] religion may coexist simultaneously, and the treaties and trade just follow the international law. If dissemination of [Christian] heterodoxy in the inland is prohibited from the very beginning, how can the commoners, reared in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius and imbued with orthodox rituals and etiquette, turn their backs on the good and begin following the evil suddenly on one morning? . . . As their religion is evil, it should be kept at a distance, just as voluptuous songs or prettiedup women, but, if their technologies are useful, why should they be avoided in such spheres as agriculture, sericulture, medicine, military, ship-building, or transport. We should simultaneously reject their religion and accept their skills. Moreover, as the actual discrepancy in strength [between us and them] is already big, how will we defend ourselves from their insults and slights, if not through accepting their skills?
After the Imo Soldiers' Mutiny, when Chinese control over Korea became stronger and the anti-Western mood penetrated even the commoners' society, the program of "Eastern morality and Western skills," quite similar to China's own contemporary attempts at "self-strengthening" through "Western affairs" ( yangwu), seemingly was the only practical course the Korean court could afford to take.
What the Korean Mission's Experience Lacked: A Comparison with the Iwakura Mission
The dispatch of the 1881 Mission to Japan was a momentous event in the history of Korea's reception of Western institutions. It was a chance for the Mission members to grasp the necessity to either build a nation-state in Korea or, at least, accept Western technology and arms, and afterward their statehood projects greatly influenced Korean society and politics. The Mission's trip to Japan was also an important landmark in the history of Korean-Japanese contacts: for the first time, the traditional roles of "exporter" and "importer" of advanced culture were traded. And it was also the first time Japan was designated as the development model Korea had to follow. For the first time in history, as many as twelve high-ranking officials traveled all around Japan, learned manifold aspects of its life first-hand, attempted to utilize their Japanese experiences donghyun huh: Korean Courtiers' Observation Mission's Viewsin Korea's own reforms, and were going to send students to Japan afterward to learn in more detail. If we look at the Mission's achievements within the framework of Korean history, comparing them with the much less tangible attainments of, for example, the 1881 Mission to China ( y0ngs0nsa) or the 1883 Mission to the United States and Europe (pobingsa) (neither of which left any meaningful records), they seem truly outstanding.
But, if the objects of comparison are the missions sent to Europe from Japan in the bakumatsu period or the Iwakura Mission, sent after the Meiji restoration, the weaknesses of the 1881 Korean Mission are more visible. Through this kind of comparison, we can understand the limitations of traditional Korea's efforts to introduce Western patterns.
Japan's Westernizing efforts were epitomized by sending abroad both diplomatic missions and students. In all, the bakufu sent six diplomatic missions to the West before the restoration in the 1860s. An eighty-strong mission went to the United States in 1862, a thirty-eight-member mission toured various European states, and so forth. Students were sent to the Netherlands and Russia (1862 and 1865, respectively), and the would-be main protagonists of the restoration, Satsuma and Choshu, also sent students to Britain secretly.
Those missions, sent to observe Europe's educational, political, and military systems, explored almost all the achievements of Western civilization, beginning with parliamentary politics, armies, state monopolies and social security institutions, a medicine, hospital management, schools, telegraph, posts, construction industries, ports, and even bonded warehouses. Especially in the case of the 1862 mission, the explorations were well organized: the lower-ranked mission members reported daily on their observations to their superiors, and the latter compiled detailed reports on each single country observed: Britain, France, Russia, and so on. 34 Most outstanding seemed to be the activity of Fukuzawa Yukichi. He was struck with admiration when he and his fellow mission members took a train for the first time, and he recorded in his diary even the size of the train, its speed, size of the rails, and the like. He was also interested in railroad management, the banking system, and the joint management of Egyptian railroads by France and Britain. On the basis of those experiences, he afterward described the structure of modern Western states systematically in his famous treatise, The Situation in the West, which also contained a vision for Japan's new statehood. The book, which became a bestseller with 150,000 to 200,000 copies, effectively implanted into Japanese minds the dream of establishment of a modern nation-state.
Fukuzawa was not the only one who dreamed of realizing Western modernity in Japan. These dreams were common for those Japanese who got a chance to "breathe foreign air" in the bakumatsu days. Ikeda Chohatsu, the head of the third mission to Europe, who was sent there under the pressure of joi isolationists korean studies, vol. 29 • 2005 to negotiate the closure of Yokohama, recognized the unfeasibility of his mission and, braving death, came back and proposed several measures to the bakufu. The proposals he risked his life for were mostly based on his personal experiences in Europe and included sending permanent embassies to all European countries, concluding treaties of friendship with all independent foreign states, sending students to France, exchanging information with European newspapers, allowing Japanese to travel abroad for commercial and academic purposes, and so on. Kodai Tomoatsu, who led the delegation of Satsuma students to Europe, came to admire the commercial and industrial blossoming of London and other major European cities. He promised European traders to establish trading companies in Japan and also made contracts for building telegraph and railway lines between Kyoto and Osaka, as well as shipbuilding and armament-making facilities. Kurimoto Joun, sent to France in 1867, came back with the Napoleonic Code translated into Japanese. Then he published a sort of introduction to the new Western civilization, Additional Records from the Dawn Window (1869), describing all kinds of Western things Kurimoto could not but admire and envythe Napoleonic Code, city planning, railways, parliaments, public loans, armies, intensive agriculture, educational systems, and so on. 35 Although in the chaos of the bakumatsu period the Europe-related information collected by the diplomats and students was not fully used, it was utilized in the process of building a Japanese nation-state after the Meiji Restoration. Those who went to Europe during the bakumatsu days then made use of their experience, accompanying the Iwakura Mission as secretaries.
The Iwakura Mission, a large-scale governmental delegation, was sent to Europe and America ten years before the Korean Mission visited Japan. Iwakura, given the title of the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, was accompanied by four deputies-State Counsellor Kido Takayoshi, Finance Minister Okubo Toshimichi, Senior Counsellor to the Ministry of Industry Ito Hirobumi, and Junior Counsellor to the Foreign Ministry Yamaguchi Naoyoshi-as well as forty-one middle-ranking bureaucrats from various governmental institutions, eighteen aides, and forty-three students. Just four months after the traditional "feudal" domains were abolished and replaced by prefectures (ken), the new-born Meiji government sent abroad half of its leaders, together with the key managers of various governmental agencies and the participants of diplomatic missions of the bakumatsu days, in a one-hundred-member delegation. 36 The character and aims of the Iwakura Mission were made clear in the farewell speech by Sanjo Sanetomi, then head of the State Council: 37 Exchanges with foreign countries are decisive for the stability or crisis of the state, and the abilities of the envoys are decisive for either glorifying or disgracing the state. Now, after the Restoration, we are going to achieve an equal place among the countries of the world, and this duty is to be discharged by you ten thousand li away from the homeland. The success of our foreign and domestic policies, the great enterprise of tomorrow all depend, in fact, on your departure and your ability to fulfill your duties. The ambassador is an elder, who has a record of meritorious service for the Restoration. You, his deputies, are all the props and stays of the state, and your attendants are also outstanding people of the generation. You should cooperate in the spirit of faithful respect to this great aim to ensure that your duty will be fulfilled. I know that your wishes will be realized in the near future. Go! Changing steamers in the sea, changing trains on the land, go, and win a reputation all over the world, and come back safely.
The Iwakura Mission, which departed in November 1871 with such a strong sense of "great duty," spent the following year and ten months touring officially the "advanced countries" of the Western world: The United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, and so on. On the way back, it also had a chance to observe the state of things in the less-developed parts of the world, namely, the Middle East and South Asia. 38 As Sanjo mentioned in his speech, Ambassador Iwakura and his deputies Okubo and Kido were among the major figures of the Restoration to come to the heights of power after their return home. On the basis of the knowledge obtained during the trip abroad, Okubo presented his Opinion on the Constitutional System of Government and Kido his Proposal to Formulate the Constitution. So, they were able to begin to realize their project of building a nation-state along the European model just after their return home. 39 Having painfully realized that the West's modern successes were not achieved overnight, they understood that, for "overcoming" its "backwardness" and entering the ranks of modern states, Japan had to simultaneously develop industry, judiciary, education, military, and all other spheres. That was the context of their rejection of Saigo's plan to "conquer Korea" on their return home. In Okubo's refutation of that plan he wrote: "Recently, the government is raising various industries in its quest for wealth and strength. In most cases, successes can be expected only in a few years. Fleet and army, education, judiciary, industrial schools, wasteland reclamation-all these things do not give results overnight." 40 Middle-ranking bureaucrats and students who accompanied the Mission also contributed to the formation of the Meiji nation-state, distinguishing themselves in various spheres. Moreover, the results of the Mission's trip were all included in the Account of Travel to America and Europe compiled by Kumi Kunitake and became a part of the public informational domain. As Kumi himself wrote, he "edited and published the results of the Mission's trip for the sake of development of the general public knowledge." In other words, he perceived the Mission as a representative of the Japanese "nation," not of the emperor, and on this basis he shared the Mission's results with the nation. 41 Korean missions that went abroad to "learn modernity" were, unlike their of the two governments in the matter of accepting modern institutions. Although twelve Korean courtiers and their assistants diligently fulfilled their mission of observing things Japanese for four months, from the very beginning their experience was not to be fully utilized in the process of Korea's modernization. First of all, they came to Japan with Kojong's secret orders as private individuals, and it could hardly have been any other way: the atmosphere of dogmatic Confucian dominance was too strong in Korea. Also they had, in comparison with Japan's missions of bakumatsu and early Meiji times, the following limitations:
First, Koreans observed Japan's modernization efforts twenty years after the Meiji reforms had begun, and their acquaintance with modernity was virtually limited to the experience of only one of its variations-the experience of Japan's Meiji project. Korean diplomats or students stayed in Japan for periods ranging from four months to one year, insufficient time to digest the achievements of the Meiji nation-state or Europe's modern intellect. There was a high possibility that they would take the modernity "translated"-or, in many cases, rather "misread" and "misinterpreted"-by the Meiji intellectuals in place of its European original. As a result, they could not but roam in the labyrinth of "triple-translated modernity," created in the process of interactions between the West and Japan, suffering from much worse intellectual chaos than their Japanese contemporaries. 42 The 1881 Korean Mission members, who were the first Koreans to encounter the Meiji-coined logographical words used for translating borrowed Western terms, experienced enormous difficulties in understanding the meanings behind these new combinations of Chinese characters. 43 Second, as Fukuzawa stressed, the Meiji missions were strongly conscious of their goal of comprehending the main points of the West's intellectual and material achievements for the sake of obtaining an equal place in the "community of nations" and were mostly staffed with energetic individuals who were in positions of power. On the other side, the members of the 1881 Korean Mission, being, of course, a group of outstandingly able courtiers, were-with the exception of 3 Yunjung and Hong Y0ngsik-hardly more than the king's "vassals" who, living in the world of traditional notions, simply followed the king's orders and participated in the Mission regardless of their personal intentions. The Mission's attendants were mostly chosen on the basis of their personal relationships with the individual courtiers and-with the exceptions of Yun Ch'iho (1865-1945) and Yu Kiljun (1856-1914), who were scheduled to remain in Japan for further studies-lacked both bureaucratic experience and professionalism. The rest of the 1881 Mission members-more than twenty lackeys and interpreters of traditional y0kkwan background-were also hardly aware of the issues of modernity enough to help the courtiers understand modern things better.
Third, Japanese missions considered it important to publish their experiences, thus sharing them with the nation, but Korean courtiers were not inter-ested in such things. On return to Korea, they spent on average around two months writing their "Reports" and "Observations" in the traditional style, with the help of petty officials good at calligraphy, to show the king how well they had fulfilled his secret orders. These "Reports" and "Observations," handwritten and bound with silk, were presented to Kojong and used then by the king and higher officials as reference materials in the process of decision-making but hardly exerted any influence in the larger community. 44
Conclusion
The 1881 Korean Mission members were able to relate the shock they felt in their encounter with Japan's bunmei kaika to Korea's rulers, contributed to changes in their value system, and influenced their decision-making process. In this respect, we can say that their Japanese experiences were socially-not just personally-meaningful. Their trip also signified the "trading of roles" in the history of Korean-Japanese cultural exchanges. The ideas of either establishing a nation-state or reforming existing structures ("Eastern morality") on the basis of "Western skills" became the two most important sources of inspiration for Korea's reforms of the 1880-1890s. At that juncture, Korea could follow either the Chinese moderate way of "Eastern morality, Western skills" reforms or the Japanese way of building a nation-state. From our present position, the latter seems to have been more desirable. The former, which acknowledged only Western technical superiority and did not recognize the importance of its basis-modern Western ideas-was, in fact, rather an anachronism.
The fact that those Mission members who favored the Japanese way were in the minority suggested that the ensuing process of Korean modernization would not be smooth. But, in a broader perspective, it may also be argued that the modern experiences in Japan also have seriously changed the views of those "Eastern morality, Western skills" advocates, who were still more flexible toward Western institutions than traditional Confucian conservatives, and imbued them with the awareness of the necessity of building a nation-state in Korea. In fact, even Fukuzawa Yukichi, when he was touring Europe in 1862, could not understand how a product of Western modernity-democracy-worked in practice. 45 But then, on the basis of his observations in the West, he grew into a modern "enlightenment" thinker. It is certain that the information on Western modernity he obtained on the spot could not have been understood by him immediately but nevertheless influenced his worldview in the longer perspective. In the same way, some of those Mission members who first stood on the "Eastern morality, Western skills" position became, in ten years, leading actors of the radical Kabo Reforms (1894-1895), aimed at the establishment of a modern nation-state through the creation of a Meiji-like centralized government and under Japan's de facto control. Pak Ch0ngyang became education minister and prime minister, Yi H0ny0ng, minister of internal affairs, and 3m Sey0ng, min-ister of agriculture and industry in the reform governments. The main organ of the Kabo reforms-the State Deliberative Council on Civil and Military Affairs (Kun'guk Kimuch'0)-had a system of "collective leadership" not dissimilar to Meiji institutions, which were appreciated by the "Eastern morality, Western skills" advocates. The system of elective local assemblies (hyanghoe) the reformers wanted to install in Korea was also largely modeled after the Meiji system of local self-rule, highly acclaimed by the erstwhile "Eastern morality, Western skills" partisans. Judging from these features of their reformist agenda, they also seem likely to have understood the necessity of building a nation-state in the long term. But why were the ideas of 3 Yunjung, who advocated the establishment of a nation-state, doomed to failure? There were many reasons, and one of them was the ill-starred Kapsin 1884 coup-ironically masterminded by 3 Yunjung's closest fellow thinkers. Others were Chinese interference and conservative Confucian reaction, which only intensified after the coup's failure.
3 Yunjung, Yu Kiljun, Yun Ch'iho, and other former Mission members or attendants, who were accused of sympathizing with the masterminds of the 1884 Kapsin coup and either sent out to petty official posts or repressed, could return to the political stage and put their new statehood projects into practice only during the 1894 Kabo Reforms. They were thinking about a Cabinet-centered constitutional monarchy able to unify the country, introduction of limited popular representation, creation of a police system, modernization of laws, and raising a standing army. As to the methods of economic strengthening, they considered increasing state income through regularizing royal finances, improving tax collection, developing new tax income sources, and government-led promotion of private industrial enterprise. These plans were to be financed by loans from Japan. As to national consolidation, they advocated creating a modern nation through abolishing the hereditary status system and building a modern educational system. To assert Korea's sovereignty and independence internationally, the tributary relationship with China was to be abolished.
Inasmuch as they planned, not unlike the radical masterminds of the Kapsin coup, to establish a nation-state with Japanese assistance and as in reality their nation-making efforts aided, to some degree, Japan's imperialist penetration, they can hardly be absolved from the charges of collaboration with Japanese imperialism. The lack of independent self-consciousness so conspicuous in their projects of foreign force-sponsored reforms remains a common inherent weakness of all Korean reform movements from above, beginning with the 1884 coup and including the 1894-95 Kabo Reforms and the 1896-99 Independence Club movement. It may be said that the dependence on foreign forces so visible in the actions of the 1884 coup masterminds represents the embryonic prototype of the tendency to rely on external sponsorship typical of all later Korean modernizers. 3 Yunjung's plans for Japan-modeled nation-building were the prototype of the nation-creating programs of almost all Korean reformist movements from 1884 up to the time of the so-called patriotic enlightenment movement (the 1910s). The reason was the visible viability of the Japanese model, although it distorted the ideals of the great French Revolution-popular sovereignty, equality, and freedom.
We should also emphasize that the forces that stood behind the Meiji project of nation-making preferred to differentiate themselves from the imagined "West," made into Japan's "Other," and followed the course of reviving Japan's ancient "traditions," a far cry from Western universalism. For one example, they used the barely preserved Shinto and imperial institutions for cultural modernization in place of Western Christianity. But, while Meiji Japanese authorities wanted the carefully systemized, protected, and nurtured Shinto to be a counterweight to Christianity, 3 Yunjung-as well as Kim Okkyun and other Kapsin coup organizers-considered Christianity a good substitute for Confucianism, an instrument for achieving "strength and wealth" and "civilizing the people." This difference of opinion on the question of the reception of Christianity was afterward reflected in very different patterns of acceptance of Christianity in Japan and Korea.
In the end, it is necessary to point out that the lack of any consideration of human rights in the government models developed by Koreans themselves at the time of the modernizing reform attempts in the 1880s and 1900s makes these models similar to the authoritarian systems established in postcolonial South and North Korea, especially to the South Korean military dictatorships after 1961. Especially interesting is the fact that the plans for centralized government-led modern state-building and foreign-loan-financed economic development worked out by 3 Yunjung look like a prototype of the state-building and developmental strategies implemented by the military governments after the coup on May 16, 1961. Time and spatial differences notwithstanding, neither could overcome the Meiji nation-building model-characteristically nondemocratic and unrelated to the universal human rights ideals of modernity.
